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Summary
This Food Brexit Briefing brings together three themes that deserve intense scrutiny at this juncture in 
the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The first is whether, even now, food attracts enough policy attention 
in the negotiating process, given its central role in both public wellbeing and the national economy. The 
second is the threat a careless Brexit poses to the UK’s food security – and the related need to have a 
new policy for the UK’s food system, from agriculture to consumption, which is genuinely sustainable, 
Brexit or no Brexit. The third is the risk generated, to the UK’s status as a potential trading partner of the 
EU, by conducting major reform of the UK food safety regulation regime at the very time at which Brexit 
negotiations are taking place and new trade deals are being sought. The Briefing Paper deals with these 
three interconnected themes in separate sections; and the fourth section then presents the Conclusions 
and Recommendations.
 
Part 1 considers whether the UK Government fully recognises the importance of food within the Brexit 
process. It suggests that the Chequers Statement and July 12 White Paper are a step forward in some 
respects. They acknowledge the significance of the agri-food sector but make a fundamental mistake 
in proposing close EU overlap only for farming and manufacturing but not retail or food service. This 
injects a fault-line into the UK food system between production and service sectors, yet food service is 
by far the largest source of employment in the entire UK food chain and delivers more gross value added 
(29%) than the other sectors (agriculture 7%; wholesaling 11%; manufacturing 26%; retailing 27%). It 
and retailing are the greatest sites of value-adding. The Government also appears to be ambiguous 
on the question of migrant workers and how essential they currently are to the working of the UK food 
system.
Part 2 considers the fragile state of UK food security and shows the risks of breaking links with the EU 
when the UK sources 30% of its food there, plus a further 11% via deals negotiated by the EU with other 
countries. The Government clearly recognises the dire consequences of getting this wrong, because 
it is apparently planning to be able to suspend food regulations in the event of a no-deal Brexit, in 
order to keep the flow of food continuing. One could argue that this is sensible emergency planning, 
but it also carries risks, as it would send signals to the EU, at a delicate time in Brexit negotiations, 
which could make the UK’s 3rd country status more problematic for exports. At the same time, because 
political attention is almost wholly on the politics of Brexit, there is a danger that the pressing issue of 
sustainability across the entire UK food system is not being fully addressed. The UK urgently needs to 
begin the transition to a more secure, sustainable and healthy approach to food, from production to 
consumption. The risk that Brexit takes attention away from that priority has grown. The Briefing urges 
that a national process should be begun and that a review to that end should be instituted.
Part 3 considers the significance of a process of reform, being undertaken by the Food Standards Agency 
(FSA), which will significantly change how food safety is addressed in the UK. The Regulating Our Future 
(ROF) programme (discussed in an earlier Food Research Collaboration Brexit Briefing) has received 
little public attention. The public needs to know that ROF heralds fundamental changes to the way in 
which food safety, standards and animal feed are to be regulated. This Briefing argues for the provision 
of clarity and evidence by the FSA in support of its proposals. It further argues that addressing the key 
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We recommend that HM Government:
Maintains a clear and explicit focus on the potential adverse effects of Brexit on food security in 
the UK, while negotiating the UK’s future trading relationships with the EU and other jurisdictions.
Publishes proper Brexit impact studies on the UK’s agricultural and food system for the White Paper 
and Chequers Statement and any subsequent proposals.
Ensures that high food standards remain at the heart of any future trade deals.
Provides clarity on its proposed migration policy, taking account of the contributions that non-UK 
citizens of the EU are making to the quantity and quality of the UK’s food supply and services.
Avoids a hard Food Brexit at all costs. The UK must not retreat to a WTO-rules-based regime. The 
EU would then categorise the UK as a ‘3rd Country’, which could be a recipe for chaos. This might 
benefit some hedge funds or traders, but at the cost of undermining the quantity and quality of the 
UK’s food supply.
Creates a new Sustainable Food Security Strategy and ground it in what we are calling a ‘One 
Nation Food Security’ framework. Such a framework would engage with the complexities of the food 
system and the multiple criteria by which it should be evaluated; it should identify clear priorities 
and pathways by which they can and will be attained. 
Recasts the proposed Agriculture Bill as a Sustainable Food Bill to provide a new legislative 
framework for a secure and sustainable food system integrating public health, consumer protection, 
animal welfare and environmental sustainability.
Provides explicit, public guarantees that responsibility for the Food Standards Agency will remain 
with the Department of Health, and that it will not be transferred to the Department for Environment 
Food and Rural Affairs.
Identifies opportunities and provides support for initiatives to improve the UK’s domestic sourcing 
of food, within the UK’s climatic and seasonal constraints. 
concerns summarised in this paper is fundamental to the UK being able to demonstrate to both domestic 
consumers and potential overseas trading partners that it is maintaining a strong and rigorous regulatory 
regime. Any weakening of food standards at this juncture could threaten the future of the UK’s food trade 
with the EU, as the EU insists that its trading partners meet its standards – hence the concern about 
possible suspension of food regulations, cited earlier. Brexit has precipitated a highly uncertain period for 
UK consumers and for the UK food system and its ongoing security. Attempting to ‘land’ the ROF programme 
at the same time risks turning a difficult situation into a potentially dangerous one. It might be argued that 
getting this wrong, at this time, would not amount to ‘taking back control’ but to loosening it.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
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Begins a process of devolved food governance for England that works better in parallel with those 
in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and harnesses the energies of city mayors and social 
movements such as the Sustainable Food Cities network.
We recommend that the Food Standards Agency:
Addresses the calls for clarification and evidence posed in this paper in respect of its Regulating 
Our Future (ROF) programme and, where such clarification or evidence is not available, then the 
Agency should modify or suspend the introduction of its proposals, at least until after Brexit. 
We further recommend that UK citizens, civil society organisation and academics redouble 
efforts to ensure sustainability is central in any post-Brexit planning, by:
Encouraging MPs to ensure there is no disruption to EU food supplies at and after Brexit.
Encouraging firms in the agricultural and food sector to improve the pay and conditions of their 
employees and to enhance learning and skills development and thus improve the attractiveness of 
this work to potential recruits. 
Contributing to regional and local committees which champion sustainable food security and build 
representative coalitions for the public interest. 
Researching the conditions under which safe and health-enhancing diets would be affordable for 
all groups of consumers.
 
>
>
>
>
>
>
Part 1: Chequers and the White 
Paper: at last a negotiating 
‘bid’ that includes food
On 6 July 2018, the UK Cabinet agreed a three-
page statement that it hoped would herald unity 
within a fractious leadership, Party and country.1 
The apparent unity lasted for less than 48 hours, 
and remains uncertain. Six days later, the White 
Paper The Future Relationship between the United 
Kingdom and the European Union was published.2 
Nevertheless, two years after a narrow but 
significant Referendum vote (52% to 48%) to leave 
the European Union (EU), there was, at last, an 
official UK plan, albeit sketchy (10 paragraph points 
over four pages) and subject to the inevitable 
subtlety of the English language (which allows 
policy wriggle-room in negotiations). The White 
Paper provides some more detail.
The welcome news from these negotiation 
documents was that agri-food was expressly 
referred to. This was a relief since the UK 
Government had abandoned a previously drafted 
25-Year Food Plan in February 2018,3 leaving 
food analysts and industry alike perplexed and 
concerned. Political uncertainties and arguments 
within the Government remain, however. Together 
with a lack of clarity about food and Brexit from 
HM Opposition, this means that UK food security 
and smooth planning for Brexit cannot be taken for 
granted. Indeed, tensions within the White Paper 
were immediately much discussed within the UK let 
alone the EU. 
A central element in HM Government’s thinking as 
laid out in the White Paper was to propose a new 
Facilitated Customs Arrangement (FCA) to enable 
flows of food (and other goods) as at present to 
and from the EU (paras 13-21), but with divergence 
of customs and tariffs available later. It also 
proposes a ‘common rulebook for agriculture, food 
and fisheries products’ (para 12d) with the EU but 
remains committed to make all its own rules and 
regulations. It will leave the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) and Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) 
(para 40), but how this will fit with having a 
common rulebook is unclear. It is committed to 
ending free movement of people but also to being 
‘open and tolerant’ and to attract the ‘brightest and 
the best’ from the EU and elsewhere (paras 73-75). 
We are not the only analysts to find these 
documents with much left unclear. President 
Trump even managed to add to that uncertainty 
on his July 12-13 visit, one moment denouncing the 
Government’s position, the next day supporting it. 
The main dynamics, however, will come from the 
EU negotiations, not the USA, although President 
Trump’s intervention might suggest some problems 
ahead over what ‘taking back control’ might 
take the UK into – having to accede to US food 
regulations speedily to get a wider trade deal done, 
for example, rather than stick with standards which 
the UK has negotiated over decades with its EU 
neighbours. 
A small step forward, but doubts 
remain
The Chequers Statement’s opening paragraph 
made a commitment to shared UK-EU ‘prosperity 
and security’. The thrust of the document was 
to propose that the UK remains overlapped and 
aligned with the EU on goods, whilst not allowing 
the free movement of people, services or finance. 
This commitment was made despite the UK having 
been a signatory to the documents enshrining the 
indivisibility of those four freedoms. In this Briefing, 
we suggest that there is much more to do before 
the goals of prosperity and security can be met 
with regard to food. The UK food system is closely 
entwined with those of its EU neighbours. The UK 
does not feed itself: its food security is heavily 
dependent on imports from other EU Member 
States. To alter this could take years, possibly 
decades. If politicians want to do this, they must 
explain to the public and the food industry how 
they envisage this happening.
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In a report a year ago, three of the four present 
authors set out 16 key issues which needed to be 
faced over any Food Brexit.4 All the present authors 
have written subsequent papers which spelt out 
the concerns.5 6 7 The Chequers Statement is a 
step forward, particularly on three issues raised 
in our July 2017 paper. The Cabinet at Chequers 
specifically acknowledged: 
a. the need to maintain EU-UK food flows; 
b. the importance of retaining current EU 
standards, and continued alignment with the 
EU’s standards as they evolve; and 
c. that there will not be a hard border between 
Northern Ireland (NI) and the Republic of 
Ireland (ROI).  
We remain troubled, however, by the lack of detail 
over how these aspirations are to be met. Trade 
deals normally take many years to conclude. The UK 
Government has left itself less than nine months to 
conclude the biggest restructuring of our economy 
and the food system since the late 1960s. David 
Davis, explaining his resignation as Secretary of 
State for Exiting the European Union, dismissed 
concerns that time is running out, arguing that EU 
negotiations always go to the wire and that the 
deadline provides the imperative.8 He ignored the 
fact that it was the UK that set the leave date and 
had failed, until now, to provide a fully formed and 
documented opening negotiation position. The 
window for serious policy negotiation is three to 
five months, in order to ensure that time remains 
for UK Parliamentary scrutiny and ratification by all 
the other 27 EU Member States and the European 
Parliament. There is also pressure building for a 
second UK referendum or ‘People’s Vote’.  
Let us acknowledge the good news. The Chequers 
Statement, firstly, recognised the necessity of 
maintaining ‘a free trade area for goods’ (para 
3); then specifically made a commitment to ‘a 
common rulebook for all goods including agri-food’ 
(para 4.a) and accepted the need for a ‘common 
rulebook’ on standards (para 4.d and again in 
6.b), which we presume includes not just food 
but animal welfare, labelling and environmental 
standards. The Statement also enshrined the need 
for open borders for Northern Ireland (para 5). 
The status of the border between the Republic of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland has, until now, been 
the largest stumbling block for the EU-27, due to the 
lack of clarity about UK intentions. The White Paper 
states that it believes it meets the need for no hard 
border.
The White Paper’s articulation of commitments on 
agri-food must surely be welcome to consumers, 
agri-food industries and analysts. It suggests 
that the pressure that had been put on DEFRA, 
its Secretary of State and other MPs has yielded 
results. Intense pressure was also put on the 
Prime Minister by senior food industry executives. 
Feedback from those executives indicated that the 
PM appeared deaf to their warnings, but perhaps 
the PM was just keeping as many of her cards as 
possible close to her chest.  
As we spell out in the next section, breaking 
with EU food trade risks serious disruption of the 
UK’s food supply after 29 March, 2019. We urge 
concerned citizens, informed commentators, 
academic scholars and food industry employees 
to keep reminding politicians of the continuing 
danger. If Brexit politics continues to be in turmoil, 
demonstrating the need for food security provides a 
constant and effective vehicle for concerted action 
towards an acceptable food Brexit.
The British Retail Consortium (BRC) was right to 
make public a letter expressing concern that was 
sent to the Prime Minister and Michel Barnier, the 
EU’s chief Brexit negotiator – just as other senior 
food industry executives had been expressing 
concern in private since late 2016.9 A food system 
engineered on a three-to-five day, ‘just-in-time’ 
logistics and delivery system has the potential 
to break down in less than a week. The Cabinet 
was wise to take the point at this late stage. We 
hope the British Government exhibits a renewed 
sense of responsibility for ensuring that this 
country achieves sustainable food security over 
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the medium to long-term as well as immediately 
(particularly in the case of a hard Brexit). People 
will need to eat properly from 30 March 2019, and 
not just once future food trade deals have been 
concluded at some unknown point in the future. 
The devil lies in the detail: 
negotiations, devolution, services, 
migration 
At the time of writing, quite how the Chequers 
Statement and the White Paper will survive or 
yield in the negotiations with the EU remains to 
be seen. Whether the UK can succeed in getting 
a deal for only one of the EU’s four supposedly 
inseparable Freedoms of Movement – for goods 
(which includes agri-food) but not for labour, 
capital or services10 – while being free to do what 
it likes globally on the latter three is especially 
uncertain. Much depends politically not just on the 
EU-27’s reaction but also on the internal dynamics 
of the Parliamentary Conservative Party and 
whether the Parliamentary Labour Party becomes 
a more articulate and effective Opposition, setting 
out what it proposes, and why, rather than just 
waiting for and watching divisions in the Cabinet. 
This is a time when routine parliamentary political 
tactics need to give way to a coordinated ‘national 
interest’ approach to Brexit and its food security 
implications. 
As a result of this Parliamentary division, we 
anticipate that two of the 16 Food Brexit key issues, 
outlined in our earlier July 2017 report, could now 
become increasingly important. They concern 
the integration (or otherwise) of the UK’s food 
policy and governance; and the status of migrant 
workers in the UK food system which has become 
increasingly part of the service economy not just 
the primary industries. 
A (dis)United Kingdom?
England has a highly centralised policy system. 
HM Government is acting both for the UK and 
for England, although Scotland and Wales have 
variable separate powers, and Northern Ireland’s 
Assembly currently remains suspended. The 
Chequers Statement and White Paper intend to 
speak for the UK as a whole but whether they 
meet Scotland’s, Wales’s or Northern Ireland’s 
aspirations is for them to say. Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland have significant agri-food sectors 
– whisky, lamb, beef, dairy, biscuits and more – 
and they have important food service sectors for 
tourism. The silence on services as a whole in the 
White Paper is extraordinary.
More generally the Withdrawal Bill enables powers 
currently controlled by Brussels to be re-patriated 
to the UK Government, including many that are 
currently devolved.11 There is an urgency to develop 
a UK framework for food security which gives 
opportunity for devolved authorities as well as the 
English regions – often forgotten governance actors 
– to participate, not least in the development of 
FSA’s evolving role after Brexit.
Brexit or no Brexit, the UK needs a rethink on food. 
Some impetus to review the future of UK food 
security followed the financial crisis of 2007-08 
and the consequent increased volatility of food 
prices on international and national markets. In 
the UK, that impetus culminated in 2010 with 
the Food 2030 strategy.12 Food 2030 addressed 
the future of the UK’s entire food system and 
gave a commitment to ensure sustainable 
food security. However, it was discarded by the 
incoming Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 
Government in 2010. We argued in our July 2017 
report that there is now an opportunity to develop 
a comprehensive and integrated UK ‘One Nation 
food policy’, with a framework that enhances 
the capacity of devolved authorities and the 
English regions to take practical steps forward. 
England and Northern Ireland need to have new 
statutory obligations, akin to Wales’s pioneering 
Well-being of Future Generations Act, which 
demand that policies and actions take account of 
impacts on future society and the environment.13 
The Westminster Government promises a new 
Agriculture Act for England. We think it ought to be 
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a Sustainable Food Act and should begin to create 
a new framework for the UK as a whole. 
Agri-food means services from 
people (including non-UK citizens) 
as well as goods (i.e. food)
One conspicuous omission in the Chequers 
Statement was its silence on the service sector. 
Given that the entire UK service sector (beyond 
food) now accounts for 79% of the UK economy by 
value and for 83% of jobs,14 many were surprised by 
that omission.
The White Paper focussed on the unhindered 
movement of goods and, within that, agricultural 
and food products. Yet the food system is not just 
agriculture, food manufacturing and their inputs. 
The food service sector is now the largest employer 
in the UK food chain (1.7m employees compared 
to food retailing’s 1.1m) with a Gross Value Added 
exceeding all other food-related sectors.15  
The growth of the food service component of 
the UK food sector has been phenomenal. Like 
other sectors in the UK, it has been heavily reliant 
on migrant workers from other EU Member 
States. Indeed, estimates as high as 40% EU 
migrant labour have been attributed to UK 
food manufacturing,16 with some firms almost 
entirely dependent on non-UK EU citizens.17 
The ‘Britishness’ of home-grown summer fruits 
substantially relies on imported workers.18 The 
numbers in horticulture may be relatively small, 
perhaps 80,000, but for the giant foodservice 
sector, they are considerable. Between 12.3% and 
23.7% of the 1.7 million food service labour force 
are non-UK EU nationals. In the London region, 
estimates range from 25.7% to 38%.19 
The Chequers Statement signalled what remains 
a fraught policy on EU migrant labour. It aimed to 
‘end free movement; giving the UK back control 
over how many people enter the country’ (para 6. h) 
yet in the next sentence stated that it will ‘include a 
mobility framework so that UK and EU citizens can 
continue to travel to each other’s territories, and 
apply for study and work – similar to what the UK 
may offer other close trading partners in the future.’ 
(para 6. i). It is not clear how the EU will respond to 
the proposals. 
Challenges ahead
The rest of this briefing reviews some of the stark 
and urgent challenges to the UK’s food insecurity. 
For example if the outcome of Brexit entails delays 
at ports such as Dover and Calais, and at either 
end of the Channel Tunnel, what will happen to 
the UK’s food supply, given the UK’s reliance on 
just-in-time food deliveries to the retail trade? 
The importance of ensuring that any Brexit deal 
includes a legally binding, enduring commitment 
to high food standards for public health, consumer 
protection and environmental sustainability will be 
highlighted. 
In that context, our concern is that regulatory 
reforms being introduced by the Food Standards 
Agency are ill-timed and pose a potential threat 
to food safety and to the prospects of UK food 
companies hoping to export to the EU’s Single 
Market. Detailed understanding of food regulations 
lies at the heart of whether Government Ministers 
are realistic in seeming to think that the UK could 
enjoy the unhindered flow of food products to 
and from the EU, while also attaining a right to 
trade foodstuffs globally even if they fail to comply 
with EU standards. The EU will not allow the UK to 
import from non-EU countries products that in the 
EU are deemed to be unacceptable, and then let UK 
firms freely process them to sell within EU’s Single 
Market. If the UK Government prioritises food trade 
with non-EU countries over trade with the EU, then 
we should expect that the EU will become distinctly 
uncooperative with the UK. But that is not what any 
of us should want.
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Part 2: Food Security
The British public expect supermarket shelves 
to be filled with a wide range of reliable, fresh 
and affordable foods. We have argued previously 
that ‘cheap’ is not actually cheap. There are large 
externalised costs from today’s highly processed, 
industrial food system due to its adverse effects 
on public health and the environment. Compared 
to the 1960s, spending on food by the British 
public, in terms of the share of disposable income 
devoted to food, has halved from about 20% to 
about 10%, although people on low incomes spend 
proportionately more of their money on food, while 
the rich spend a far lower share. Despite those 
adverse externalities and rampant inequalities, the 
food system has often enabled people to spend 
more on non-food items, such as cars, housing 
IT and holidays. The vast majority of people in 
this country take for granted the performance of 
the complex, logistically sophisticated, evolving 
and unstable system on which our food supply 
and food markets depend. We may see the 
large lorries on our roads, but we don’t see the 
satellites and the computers that are integral to 
the logistics revolution. The cash tills that tally the 
consumer’s purchases at the checkout also directly 
communicate with the supply chain to order 
replacements. Much of the stock and storage is in 
trucks on the motorways and autoroutes. 
The fragility of ‘efficiency’
Under the Cabinet Office, there is a regular review 
of national resilience. Food is one of the 13 sectors 
considered. According to the published summary, 
‘[t]he UK Food sector has a highly effective and 
resilient food supply chain, owing to the size, 
geographic diversity and competitive nature of the 
industry.’20  A recent study has also suggested that 
the UK has adequate supply of all key nutrients 
except fibre (due to consumption of refined rather 
than whole wheat flour).21  At one level, this is all 
most reassuring, but questions arise with regard 
to sourcing, the just-in-time nature of current food 
logistics and the reliance of food infrastructure 
on other sectors such as fuel, transport and trade 
routes. These are all affected by Brexit. 
The British Retail Consortium (BRC) reminded the 
Prime Minister before the Chequers meeting that 
about 10,000 containers of food come into the UK 
from the EU daily, among the 3.6 million containers 
that pass through our ports annually, supplying 
about 50,000 tonnes of food to the UK food trade.22 
The BRC had previously reported its assessment 
that, in a no-deal Brexit scenario, World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) tariffs on foods imported to 
the UK from the EU would average 22%.23 Tariffs 
could be as high as 46% for cheese or 21% for 
tomatoes. If the UK chose not to set those tariffs, 
UK producers would be driven out of business as 
they would become seriously uncompetitive. Brexit 
on a no-deal or WTO basis would be, as one leading 
food manufacturer informed us, ‘disastrous’24 And, 
as a leading horticulturalist asked us: ‘are they 
seriously thinking they could get tomatoes into the 
UK from West Africa quicker and cheaper than from 
the Netherlands?’25  
What little UK-grown horticulture there is, depends 
massively on EU migrant labour. The Chequers 
Statement only addresses this with regard to those 
immigrants who are already in the UK and have 
been here for at least five years. The previous 
Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme (SAWS) 
was abolished in 2013 by the Conservative-
Liberal Democrat Coalition; it was confident that 
Eastern EU workers would fill any gaps.26 27 Events 
have unfolded surprisingly rapidly: some UK 
based horticultural companies have started new 
subsidiary enterprises in Africa to grow foods for 
the British market, whilst some UK harvests have 
gone ungathered.28 Moving production abroad 
is unlikely to resolve the UK’s fundamental food 
labour problem, as was explained in the July 2017 
report. HM Government oscillates between denying 
there are problems, insisting that market forces 
can and will resolve them, and fantasising about a 
labour-free future relying on robotics. Such signals 
do little to provide industrial certainty, or put food 
on our plates.
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Like all systems operating to finely tuned 
specifications, the UK food system is fragile and 
vulnerable to disruption. There have been previous 
early warnings. Back in 2000, blockades of depots 
by a few hundred fuel delivery drivers seriously 
disrupted UK food distribution within 24 hours.29 
More recently, the shortage of industrial quantities 
of CO2 in June 2018 not only exposed the food 
system’s dependence on this ingredient (from 
stunning animals for slaughter to the production 
of crumpets and beer) but also showed how 
intermeshed the north European food sectors are, 
with CO2 sourced across Europe.30 
European integration has been a key to the 
creation of this complex food logistics system. A 
transformation of the UK’s food system began in 
1967-73 while the UK was negotiating to join the 
Common Market; which, in turn, became the EU. 
The transformation accelerated when, in 1975, a 
majority of UK voters chose, in a Referendum, to 
stay in the Common Market. It was significantly 
boosted by the creation of the European Single 
Market in 1992. That facilitated a wave of change 
that swept through the EU food system, with 
many parts of food chain experiencing rapid 
concentration through mergers and acquisitions. 
A small number of dominant firms became 
pre-eminent in sectors such as dairy products, 
confectionery, beverages and frozen foods. Many 
firms in the UK food industry have been alarmed by 
the thought that Brexit would disrupt the markets, 
trades and infrastructure on which they rely. The 
Chequers Statement appears to suggest that HM 
Government now recognises that ending this 
Europeanised food system at the end of March 
2019, even with a transition period of two years 
thereafter, would be folly and is impractical. 
Where does UK food come from?
The UK does not feed itself and the UK’s domestic 
production of food has been steadily declining 
since the early 1980s; self-sufficiency is now, by 
value, only about 60% (see Figure 1). 
Source: DEFRA (2017) 31
If we consider the flow of unprocessed, as opposed 
to processed, foods the UK supplied less than half 
(49%) of its unprocessed food in 2016. The sources 
by region are given in Table 1. 
Table 1:  Regions supplying unprocessed food to the UK, 
2016, by % 
Region % supplied to the UK
UK 49%
EU 30%
Africa 5%
North America 4%
South America 4%
Asia 4%
Rest of Europe 2%
Australasia 1%
Source: DEFRA (2017)32 
FIGURE 1: UK Food production to supply ratio (percentage of ‘self-sufficiency’), 1988 to 2016. Source: DEFRA (2017)31
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The UK has had a rising food trade gap (see Figure 
2). In 2017, the UK imported food, drink and animal 
feed worth £46.2bn. It exported only £22bn-worth, 
of which whisky accounted for nearly a fifth. The UK 
not only has a serious food dependency problem, 
but it is haemorrhaging what used to be called the 
balance of payments. 
Source: DEFRA (2018)33
Figure 3 shows the main countries from which 
the UK obtains its food, by value. Although there 
are vociferous calls in the Conservative Party 
for the UK to do ‘big trade deals’ with the USA, 
the USA has made it clear that this would only 
happen for financial services if the UK abandoned 
its attachment to food standards which the US 
Government views as unnecessary.34 Indeed, 
Wilbur Ross, US Commerce Secretary, stated that 
abolishing EU food standards was essential for any 
UK-USA free trade deal.35 36 No-one yet seems to 
have recognised that the USA would have to fill a 
huge gap in foodstuffs if it were to replace the food 
the UK currently imports from the EU. US exports 
to the UK are currently proportionately tiny; it is 
10th out of the top 10 food exporters to the UK (see 
Figure 3). For the USA to replace the combined food 
imports from the other nine of the top 10 would 
require a vast food flotilla and logistics operation, 
exceeding that of the 1940-45 Atlantic Convoys 
– which would need to be ready to start in nine 
months’ time! As one senior food industry manager 
told us: ‘this is dangerous fantasy’.37 The US might 
sell hormone-grown, cheap beef to the UK but this 
would require the UK to leave EU standards which 
do not permit use of such hormones. And tomatoes 
could hardly claim to be fresh if they’ve made a 
trans-Atlantic trip. 
FIGURE 3: Imports of food to the UK, by country of 
dispatch, 2017, by value (£m). Source: DEFRA (2018)38
The actual UK import dependency is greater than 
financial figures suggest. De Ruiter and colleagues 
have calculated that the UK currently imports over 
FIGURE 2: The value of food, feed and drink, at 2017 prices. Source: DEFRA (2018)33
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50% of its food and animal feed by value, and 
that 70% of associated cropland and 64% of gas 
emission impacts are located abroad.39 
UK vulnerabilities seem clear. There are several 
serious potential threats to UK food security, 
especially in relation to the following issues. 
• Business continuity: Contracts for food 
supplies are typically set 12 months ahead. 
UK food comes via a complex logistics system 
run on a just-in-time basis, i.e. three to five 
days’ supply. There are only tiny food stocks, 
commercial or public, held in the UK’s food 
distribution chain.
• Food safety: Inspections of food take place 
‘at source’ while the UK is in the EU. If we 
leave the Customs Union / Single Market, 
inspections will have to take place at our 
ports (including airports for air-freighted 
foods). At the moment, port inspection of 
EU-derived food amounts to just paperwork 
completion that takes an average of 2 
minutes. In the event of a hard Brexit and the 
establishment of customs and food safety 
clearances, merely increasing the delay will 
generate lorry tailbacks extending to more 
than 17 miles (as modelled by Imperial 
College) within the first 24 hours.40
• Home-produced UK food supplies: Though 
slowly declining overall since a high point in 
the 1980s, the potential for home production 
will be significantly affected by whichever 
new framework is adopted. Some scenarios 
now suggest negative financial impacts, 
both in relation to likely subsidy cuts and 
the ‘clout’ of food and farming in trade deals, 
although prior to the Referendum some were 
more optimistic.41 An AHDB study at the end 
of 2017 showed that farm incomes would 
more than halve if the UK opened its borders 
to a low-cost regime, would drop by less than 
half if it adopted a unilateral protectionist 
regime, and would rise if a free-trade deal 
was struck with the EU.42 
Sustainability – broadening what 
is meant by food security
It would be wrong to consider food security 
simply as a matter of tonnage on shelves. ‘It 
doesn’t matter where food comes from or how’, 
a Government advisor once said: ‘all that matters 
is that it’s there.’43 He was wrong then and is 
completely wrong now, but this sentiment is not 
uncommon, and could easily be played upon in 
coming months.
The food system is one of the biggest sources 
of greenhouse gas emissions, biodiversity loss, 
social injustice and diet-related ill-health.44 
Notwithstanding Brexit, almost all the prognoses 
about our food supply to 2050 point to a serious 
squeeze on resources, land, water and people.45 
Whether in or out of the EU, in hard or soft or no 
Brexit, the UK needs to change its food system 
considerably. Brexit should not undermine that 
goal.
The UK is a signatory to the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals,46 the Paris Climate Change 
Accord,47 and the Convention on Biodiversity,48 all 
of which require food system changes nationally 
and globally. Those targets are not likely to be 
achieved without a radical shift in UK and in 
other high-income countries’ food systems and 
patterns of consumption.49 What matters is not 
just that the UK has enough food to eat, but rather 
what is eaten and how it is produced, processed, 
distributed and consumed. Sustainability requires 
more than cutting emissions of CO2 or cutting 
waste. It will require a multi-dimensional approach 
that connects public and environmental health 
with culture, economics, societal values and 
governance. 
The UK needs to reverse the damage being 
caused by poor diets, particularly for low income 
consumers. The UK diet had the highest proportion 
of ultra-processed food (high in fat, salt and sugar) 
consumption in 1998-2011 across 19 EU countries.50 
The average household availability of ultra-
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processed foods ranged from 10·2% in Portugal 
and 13·4% in Italy to 46·2% in Germany and 50·4% 
in the UK. The marketing and availability of such 
products distort eating patterns and impose 
long-term ill-health costs on the NHS. The rates 
of obesity in both children and adults, as well as 
the rising trends, are unsustainable. Cambridge 
University’s CEDAR & MRC Epidemiology Unit Food 
Environment data have highlighted the coincidence 
of the locations of ‘junk food’ outlets and social 
deprivation.51  
The USA or Brazil might be only too willing to 
supply cheap and plentiful beef or poultry to the 
UK after Brexit, but to meet climate change targets, 
countries such as the UK and USA ought to be 
reducing their meat consumption; ironically, the 
UK, famed as a land of roast beef, actually imports 
more meat in total than it exports.52 In 2017, the 
UK was only 81% self-sufficient in cattle meat; 61% 
for pigmeat; 90% for poultry; 101% for sheep and 
lamb; 105% for milk and dairy; and 86% for eggs.53 
Social inequalities in the UK diet are lamentable. 
Low-income consumers have already been affected 
by higher food prices since the pound dropped 
in value, following the Referendum. Food Banks 
have been normalised; they are no longer short-
term crisis management.54 British eating patterns 
are socially polarised and increasingly so.55 56  We 
are not romanticising the pre-EU UK diet. UK food 
was famous for being brown, over-cooked and 
plain. In culinary terms, membership of the EU has 
contributed to a transformation of UK food culture 
in some good and some adverse directions. The 
UK now has more varieties of artisanal cheese, for 
example, than France. 
Eating patterns and children’s diets are influenced 
by commercial interests, and especially by 
advertising.57 Food companies spend 27 times 
more on advertising than the UK Government 
spends on promoting healthy eating.58 Brexit must 
not be an opportunity for deregulation that would 
encourage a ‘permanently eating’ culture. The UK’s 
NHS spends £16bn on treating the results of excess 
eating, more than the Home Office allocates to the 
police.59
The Government and Opposition 
must clarify positions on food 
security
UK governments of all hues, in recent years, have 
tended to take the view that this country is food 
secure because its people can afford to buy food 
sourced from abroad. There is a long history to this 
policy, which became particularly important in UK 
politics in debates over the Corn Laws in the early 
19th century. With the 1846 Repeal of the Corn 
Laws, the policy became one of increasing reliance 
on external (often colonial) sources for imports. By 
the late 19th century UK agriculture had been run 
down, only for shocks to occur during World Wars 
1 and 2. Learning the lessons from WW2 produced 
new, bi-partisan support for rebuilding the UK’s 
domestic food supplies, which culminated in the 
1947 Agriculture Act. Domestic food production 
grew to a high point in the early 1980s, supported 
initially by the UK’s deficiency payments subsidy 
scheme and then by Common Agricultural Policy 
subsidy schemes. If the Chequers Statement 
remains HM Government’s position and if the EU 
agrees with it, the UK’s agri-food supply will remain 
Europeanised, but as the saying has it: nothing is 
agreed until everything is agreed.  
The UK Government must clarify its vision for 
feeding the UK. In such a period of political 
contestation, it is not surprising there are 
competing narratives in the Government and on 
the backbenches. One can distinguish between five 
contrasting positions, pulling the UK away from its 
European policy framework. They are:
• ‘Atlanticist’: Liam Fox and others have 
proclaimed the attractions of the UK sourcing 
food imports from the USA, as part of a 
wider future UK-US trade deal,60 but concerns 
emerged about the US’s lower food standards.61
• ‘Neo-Imperialist’: Michael Gove voiced 
support in the Referendum campaign for 
other countries to produce food for the UK to 
replace imports from the EU. The concern is 
whether this would be cheaper, sufficiently safe 
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and sustainable.62 Lowering tariffs could be 
key to this, to attract imports, but that would 
undermine UK producers.63
• ‘Mercantilist’: Brexit is seen as an opportunity 
to increase exports of UK processed food and 
drink products, not least to counter the growth 
of imports.64
• ‘Nationalist’: Those favouring increasing 
UK domestic production, perhaps to 
higher standards, but this approach fails 
to acknowledge the limits implied by our 
geography and climate.
• ‘Disengaged’: Some (such as in the Treasury) 
see food as either of little interest or as a 
sub-issue of macro-economics that should be 
left to the market (ignoring how markets are 
dependent on and framed by politics). This 
group argues that the agri-food sector does not 
deserve special treatment.
These are important distinctions. Such policy 
assumptions and choices shape not just what land 
is used for but whether or not a food and farm 
sector can thrive, or even survive, in the UK. We are 
critical of all those five perspectives, all of which 
are over-simplified. We are advocating what we 
term a ‘One Nation Food Security’ framework, which 
would engage with the complexities of the food 
system, and the multiple criteria by which it should 
be evaluated, but which nonetheless identifies 
clear priorities, and pathways by which they can 
and will be attained. 
Some Neo-Imperialists suggest that the UK could 
abandon support for its farm sector and ‘do a New 
Zealand’, cutting all farm subsidies.65 Although 
there are big differences between the UK and 
New Zealand, some see the future for UK primary 
production as being forced to become more 
‘efficient’ and productive, as happened to New 
Zealand farming.66 In the UK, this would have a 
direct, rapid and adverse impact on much upland 
farming. Horticulture is not subsidised in the UK, 
but is reliant on EU migrant labour, especially for 
harvesting. Much of UK farming is kept afloat by EU 
subsidies. In 2016, UK farming’s total income was 
£3.7bn, of which £3.2bn (81%) was EU subsidies.67 
Some analysts now forecast that up to 25% of 
UK farms will ‘go under’ if those subsidies are 
abolished.68 Perhaps wisely, Mr Gove has extended 
the promise to maintain subsidies at current levels 
to 2024. This is not far ahead, though perhaps far 
enough for him no longer to be at DEFRA.69
The Government has to date failed to prepare any 
proper studies of Brexit’s likely impact on the UK 
food system – this is shocking negligence. We 
understand that embryonic drafts were prepared 
in DEFRA, but never completed because of the lack 
political clarity. David Davis, the then Secretary 
of State for Exiting the EU, even admitted to 
the lack of impact studies , when he gave his 
evidence to the Commons Select Committee in 
December 2017.70 This was unacceptable then and 
is dangerous now. 
The Labour Party’s position also requires 
clarification. The Labour leadership is said to be 
reluctant to go against its Northern, working-class 
supporters, many of whom voted for Brexit. At 
the Referendum, 65% of Labour voters voted to 
remain in the EU.71 More recently, however, an 
overwhelming majority of Labour Party members 
have been found to want to stay in the customs 
union (87%) and single market (85%).72
And if there is disruption to the food system from 
Brexit or a squeeze on incomes, it is low-income 
consumers who will be most affected, as food is a 
flexible item in household expenditure and income 
is a major determinant of health. One might have 
expected, therefore, that Labour would be alive to 
Brexit’s implications for the food system. The leader 
of the Labour Party is reputedly of the view that 
the EU is a Big Capitalist Club, but also has been 
reported to be becoming more open to a customs 
union.73 74 Membership of the EU has done much 
to protect UK food security, and improve standards 
of health and safety and environmental protection, 
but we are of the view that the UK food system has 
long required a new vision. This surely is what the 
Labour leadership as HM Opposition ought to be 
pressing Government to deliver, Brexit or no Brexit.
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Food can and should be a unifying theme in the 
UK. Since our July 2017 report, which set out the 
argument that the UK must not accept worsening 
standards for health and consumer protection, 
and which put chlorinated chicken on the political 
agenda, some of the most gung-ho MPs and pro-
Brexit rhetoric have been undermined. The White 
Paper and Chequers Statement confirmed that the 
PM and the Cabinet now recognise the potential 
adverse effects of Brexit on UK food security. 
Polling also suggests that the British public is 
overwhelmingly hostile to any lowering of food 
standards. A large majority of the British public 
would prefer to keep current food safety standards 
(82%) over lowering standards for a trade deal 
with the USA (8%). More people back alignment 
with EU consumer, environmental and employment 
standards for a far-reaching UK-EU trade deal (49%) 
than back the weakening of these standards post-
Brexit (28%).75
Preparing for a no-deal Food 
Brexit
Our view is that the UK will need to maintain open 
and unhindered borders with the EU for food, as 
well as for many other goods and services, not 
least since it helps maintain the commitments of 
the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement, as we argued 
elsewhere.76 But what if there is no-deal on 28 
March 2019, despite David Davis’s assurance that 
getting agreements at the last moment is the EU 
norm  ‘Hard’ Brexiters want the UK completely 
detached from the EU, and trading on World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) rules.77 The Prime Minister told 
the Cabinet in July to prepare for no-deal.78 She is 
right but it is already happening in Defra in some 
worrying directions.
In recent months, we have learned from a senior 
Government advisor that plans are being prepared 
to ‘suspend food controls’ if there are any delays 
to imports of perishable foods at our borders. We 
learned too that other policy commentators had 
been told the same by senior DEFRA personnel. 
One Government advisor even informed us that the 
plans were being devised ‘to avoid Parliamentary 
scrutiny’.79 Senior industry people have told us 
in no uncertain terms that this would be folly 
and must be avoided, not least because it would 
threaten exports from the UK to the EU. If the UK 
were to suspend food safety controls, others might 
block exports from a country taking such a cavalier 
approach to public health. It would go completely 
against all the protestations of commitment to high 
consumer and health standards. Yet this appears 
to be what DEFRA envisages. There had also been 
several hints that other parts of the Government 
endorsed that proposal. 
On 28 February 2018, George Eustice MP, Minister 
of State at DEFRA, informed the House of Lords 
EU Environment Committee that, in the event of a 
no-deal Brexit, DEFRA envisages operating on the 
basis of a risk-based ‘mutual recognition’ regime. 
This assumed that food in the EU is acceptably safe 
to eat and therefore would be safe to import and 
distribute in the UK, without introducing any safety 
checks.80 
In March 2018, Transport Secretary of State Chris 
Grayling stated on BBC TV that the UK will not ‘in 
any circumstances’ create a ‘hard border’ at Dover 
by imposing lorry checks after Brexit.81 He said: 
‘We will maintain a free-flowing border at Dover, 
we will not impose checks at the port, it is utterly 
unrealistic to do so. We don't check lorries now, 
we're not going to be checking lorries in the future.’ 
He was incorrect: there are checks, an average of 
two minutes per lorry, if the border authorities have 
concerns. And these can be important for health. 
This thinking might be presented as ‘emergency 
planning’ but it could be catastrophically counter-
productive. Firstly, it would contradict the 
Government’s explicit commitment to maintaining 
high standards. Secondly, it would threaten the 
UK’s food exports. Thirdly, it could consign the UK 
to pariah status in the eyes of the EU.  
Answers to parliamentary questions suggest, 
however, that ministers are anticipating delays 
arising from non-recognition of standards either 
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side of the English Channel. Steve Brine MP, 
Minister at the Department of Health & Social Care, 
for example, replying to Caroline Lucas MP, stated: 
82 
‘A range of solutions are being investigated 
to ensure that from day one, imported food 
and feed can continue to enter the UK with the 
appropriate checks. Our planning will ensure 
that, from the day the UK leaves the EU, we will 
have the necessary resources to continue to 
protect UK consumers from food safety risks.’ 
And in another answer he said: 
‘Departments are also working together to 
identify the range of issues that will impact on 
the borders, including pinch points for specific 
ports and capacity for food sampling. A range of 
options are being investigated to address these 
issues and ensure that effective solutions are in 
place.’
If border checks rose to four minutes, there would 
be 20-mile or so (possibly even 29-mile) lorry tail-
backs within a day, 83 84 85 hence the fall-back, we 
presume, of suspending food controls to allow all 
traffic to be waved through. This is not ‘taking back 
control’, it is abandoning it. 
Threats to food safety in the UK 
from imported products, after 
Brexit
In our July 2017 report, we highlighted four 
examples of potential food safety risks that might 
be a consequence of the UK agreeing a free trade 
deal with the USA.86 They were: beef hormones, 
bovine somatotropin (BST) used in milk production, 
genetic modification (GM) of crops, and the use 
of chlorinated disinfectants to reduce bacterial 
contamination of poultry carcasses.
Of those four topics, ‘chlorine-washed chicken’ 
was the one most widely discussed in the print 
and broadcast media, and in Parliament, and has 
entered the discourse as a symbol of whether 
standards rise or are subverted.87 It is also an issue 
on which important new evidence has emerged. 
In early 2018 we learnt that while chlorinated-
water is not permitted in the EU for use to disinfect 
contaminated poultry, its use is permitted to 
disinfect leafy vegetables and horticultural 
products. In May 2018 a team of scientists based 
at the University of Southampton published a 
paper showing that spraying leafy vegetables with 
chlorinated water did not reduce the presence 
or virulence of the bacteria, but it changed them 
into a ‘viable-but-nonculturable (VBNC) state’, 
which means that while the bacteria remained in 
place and infectious, their presence could not be 
shown using the standard technique for detecting 
bacteria.88 Those tests involve trying to grow, or 
‘culture’, samples of microbes in glass dishes 
on suitable substrates. The researchers used a 
different technique enabling them to detect those 
bacteria on the vegetable leaves, after chlorinated 
water was used; the treatment blocks and so 
invalidates conventional culture tests, but as a 
disinfectant it is entirely ineffective.   
When the researchers said: ‘These data emphasize 
the risk that VBNC food-borne pathogens could 
pose to public health should they continue to go 
undetected,’ they understated the importance of 
their findings. Their new findings imply that current 
practices in the UK, and even more importantly in 
the USA, need to change, and to change urgently. 
Given that US food producers use chlorinated-
water far more extensively than do UK and 
European producers, as they apply them not just 
to vegetables and poultry but also on fish, fruit 
and non-leafy vegetables, those facts might help 
explain why the rate of food poisoning in the USA is 
approximately 10 times as high as it is in the UK.89 
There is an evident and urgent need for similar 
studies to be conducted across the entire range 
of anti-bacterial washes that are used on food in 
the UK, the EU, the USA and the rest of the world, 
to examine their effects, and effectiveness, on the 
full range of foods which are treated with them. Are 
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any of them ever effective? Or do they only block 
and so invalidate the conventional tests? And, how 
can production standards be improved so that our 
food supply is not contaminated with pathogenic 
bacteria, and so does not need to be disinfected?
The UK therefore has even stronger reasons for 
rejecting chlorine-washed US poultry meat than 
we had 12 months ago. For the other three issues 
highlighted in July 2017, we have no reason to think 
that the risks they pose are any lower than we 
thought they were 12 months ago.  
On the other hand, several other problematic 
features of US food production practices and 
standards have been recognised. They include the 
fact that pesticides are sprayed more frequently 
and more widely in US agriculture than is the 
case in the UK and EU. Moreover the maximum 
permitted residue levels of pesticides in the 
USA are often substantially higher than those 
permitted in the EU. Importing US produce would 
therefore entail a marked increase in the amounts 
of pesticides residues that UK consumers would 
ingest. The standards of animal welfare in US meat, 
egg and dairy sectors are significantly lower than 
those in the EU, and as UK standards are in some 
respects stricter than those in other EU countries, 
the gap between what is deemed acceptable in the 
UK and the USA is especially wide.90
In the EU, it is unlawful to administer a drug called 
ractopamine to pigs. Pigs fed ractopamine develop 
more muscle tissue and less fat than similar pigs 
fed a similar diet but without the drug. A meatier 
and less fatty carcass is more profitable but 
less safe. There is extensive evidence indicating 
possible adverse effects to both pigs and pork-
eaters. In 2009 the European Food Safety Authority 
concluded diplomatically there ‘were not enough 
data to show that it is safe for human consumption 
at any level’. In the USA, however, the Food and 
Drug Administration deems the ‘benefits’ of using 
ractopamine to outweigh the risks, but some 160 
other jurisdictions disagree.91
Another practice deemed acceptable by the US 
authorities is to incorporate what is politely referred 
to as ‘chicken litter’, i.e. poultry bedding material 
mixed with chicken faeces, as an ingredient in 
animal feed products, including those intended for 
poultry. The UK’s experience with BSE was sufficient 
to persuade us of the risks that can arise when 
animal wastes are incorporated into animal feeds. 
Feeding cattle wastes back to cattle massively 
increased the numbers of animals that were 
infected with BSE, and accelerated the rate at which 
the disease spread from herd to herd.92  
The US food supply also contains a wider range 
of food additives than are permitted in the EU, 
and at higher levels of usage than are authorised 
in the EU. For example potassium bromate and 
azodicarbonamide are authorised for use in US 
bread-making as ‘dough improvers’, but deemed 
unacceptable in the EU. Where the lists of 
substances permitted in both the USA and the EU 
as food additives overlap, often the USA accepts 
higher levels of usage than has been deemed 
acceptable or necessary in the EU.
Furthermore, US food labelling standards provide 
consumers with far less information than is the 
case in the EU. US food industry representatives 
have told the US Government that in any US-UK 
trade deal after Brexit, the UK should be obliged to 
accept any food product that complies with current 
US legislation and regulations. On a few occasions 
UK ministers have indicated that they would not 
accept any reduction in UK food safety standards 
in exchange for a UK-USA trade deal, but different 
ministers have been saying different things, and it 
is far from clear if they can be relied upon fully to 
deliver on their promises. 
UK food producers also have a direct interest 
in these matters. If US foodstuffs enter the UK’s 
market in the same conditions as they enter the 
US market, the export of foodstuffs from the UK to 
the EU will at best become very difficult, or at worst 
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completely impossible. Very few UK producers, and 
no British retailers whatsoever, are keen on the 
UK accepting US products that fail to comply with 
prevailing EU standards, or on the introduction 
of US practices into the UK. This is therefore a 
relatively rare topic on which the representatives 
of UK consumers and of the UK food industry are in 
full agreement. The position of the British   
Government on these matters, as so many others, 
is harder to discern. 
Problems with the safety of the UK’s food supply 
after Brexit are by no means all linked to food 
exports. There are also important domestic 
developments that threaten food safety in the UK.
 
Part 3: Ensuring Food Safety at 
a time of Brexit – Regulating 
our Future (ROF)
The defining characteristics of the current, long-
standing system governing the regulation of food 
safety and standards in the UK include: 
• Food laws centred on protecting consumers 
by ensuring that food is safe and what it says 
it is;
• Food business operators (FBOs) must show 
that they have adopted suitable hygienic 
practices on their premises;
• The risks associated with food processing 
and preparation have to be assessed by 
FBOs, industry and food law enforcement 
officers;
• Standards of protection are to be achieved by 
enforcing specific provisions (with breaches 
resulting in criminal sanction) that seek to 
minimize the risk of unsafe food being offered 
for sale; 
• Food safety law and its enforcement are 
carried out by a number of actors operating at 
local, national and European levels; 
• The UK’s devolved administrations in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are 
competent to make food hygiene laws and 
issue Codes of Practice, having regard to the 
advice of the Food Standards Agency (FSA);
• Local authorities perform a key role in 
enforcing food safety laws through the 
functions carried out by Environmental 
Health Officers (EHOs) and Trading Standards 
Officers (TSOs): 
• Typically, but not exclusively, food safety 
is the responsibility of EHOs and food 
standards the responsibility of TSOs; 
• EHOs monitor compliance with the 
minimum standards required by EU and 
UK legislation; promote guidance and 
best practice on higher standards; and 
they are empowered to take enforcement 
action to secure minimum standards.
FSA’s proposals for change
Food standards and their enforcement 
are important at the best of times. At the 
unprecedented time of Brexit, they are vital but 
problematic. However, the key body in the UK that 
monitors and is the guardian of those standards, 
the Food Standards Agency (FSA), has embarked 
on a major redevelopment, namely its Regulating 
our Future (ROF) programme. Within the context of 
the general uncertainty being generated by Brexit, 
the timing of this redevelopment could not be more 
unfortunate and, if it is to proceed, it will have to be 
managed with the utmost care as it could:
 
• destabilise the already uncertain Brexit 
predicament just when the UK needs to 
demonstrate to the EU and to the wider world 
rigorous inspections and enforcement; and
• threaten the future of the UK’s food trade 
with the EU as the EU insists that its trading 
partners meet the EU’s standards.
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ROF: a new regulatory approach is 
being unfolded
The FSA’s ROF programme is intended to modify 
the arrangements in the UK through which food 
is regulated. All aspects of food regulation – food 
safety, food standards and animal feed – are 
within the scope of the ROF programme. The 
programme envisages implementing ROF in two 
phases – before 30 March 2019 and after Brexit. 
The UK has a relatively safe food supply, by 
comparison with many other countries, although 
there is undoubtedly some room for improvement. 
The FSA has yet to provide a sufficiently 
compelling, evidence-based case of the need for 
transformational change.
An overview of the ROF programme was first 
published by FSA in July 2017 in its document 
Regulating our Future – why food regulation needs 
to change and how we are going to do it. The FSA 
publishes key papers on this programme on the 
web.93 
Contextualising ROF 
The 2017 Cabinet Office report Regulatory Futures 
Review set a framework for future regulation and 
ROF is following that framework. 94 One of the key 
drivers behind the ROF programme is the issue 
of falling capacity of local authorities (particularly 
in England) to deliver the current food control 
requirements. 
Drawing on data from the Department for 
Communities and Local Government, Kane has 
estimated that between 2009/10 and 2015/6 
English local authority expenditure on food law 
enforcement declined by some 22%.95 Figures 
issued by the FSA reveal that between 2015/16 and 
2016/17 the number of food samples collected by 
EHOs in the entire UK fell by 22% (from 21,563 to 
16,746), while just in England they fell by 24.9% 
(i.e. by almost one quarter, from 12,245 to 9,196).96  
The FSA acknowledged that ‘local authorities … are 
under increasing financial pressure, such that some 
are struggling to fully discharge their functions’.97 
The impact on public health has not yet been 
quantified or communicated.
A distinctive feature of the FSA’s proposals is to tap 
into businesses’ own data on food safety-critical 
parameters, to provide assurance to the regulator 
that food that is produced is safe and what it 
says it is. It is, however, an ongoing concern that 
businesses will not willingly share their data due 
to commercial sensitivities or, where they do agree 
to share, they will be selective in the data that they 
share.
The FSA is currently indicating that in exchange 
for providing more and reassuring data, FBOs will 
be subject to fewer and less intrusive inspections 
from the FSA or local authority officials. The FSA 
has yet to reveal whether or not it will seek extra 
powers that would enable it to compel FBOs to 
provide public officials with data on safety-critical 
parameters. 
At the end of the ROF reforms, the FSA proposes 
to retain its position as the UK’s central Competent 
Authority, and to continue to be seen to be and 
act as a strong regulator. If public authorities have 
access to more comprehensive and timely data on 
the food safety performance of FBOs, that could 
be a major step forward, but not if FBOs’ use 
of Regulated Private Assurance (RPA) becomes 
an excuse for resources for local government to 
employ Environmental Health and/or Trading 
Standards Officers to be cut. 
Where the FSA has evidence that a Local Authority 
has neither the capacity, nor the capability, to 
deliver an acceptable service, the FSA should use 
its current powers (under the Food Safety Act 1990) 
and take appropriate action to ensure acceptable 
delivery.
The ROF proposals largely mirror the recently-
adopted New Zealand model of food regulation98. 
In January 2017, the New Zealand Institute of 
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Environmental Health reported that the new 
arrangements were problematic in terms of the 
failure of private sector assurers to report food 
hygiene problems to NZ local authorities; added 
to industry’s costs; and generated confusion for 
consumers and businesses.
The development of a holistic approach to food 
safety, food standards and feed regulation, as 
intended by ROF, is broadly supported but this 
also assumes that investment will be made in the 
development of UK food officers to ensure that they 
are appropriately skilled and competent to deliver 
official controls across all areas of food.
ROF - costs and businesses paying 
for regulation
One of the key principles of ROF is that businesses 
should meet the costs of regulation. This is sensible 
as long as the ROF proposals don’t end up costing 
UK PLC significantly more than the current system 
and delivering fewer benefits, lower standards of 
public protection or reduced confidence in the 
system. At a time of Brexit, with all its complexities 
and uncertainties, such a loss of confidence in the 
food control system in the UK would be extremely 
damaging.
Clarity is needed from the FSA on both the costs 
of the current and proposed systems to industry, 
the FSA and Local Authorities; as well as the 
anticipated savings to the public purse that ROF 
might provide. It is also important to know the 
FSA’s response to the argument, advanced by food 
businesses, that they are already paying to be 
regulated via their business rates! 
Enhanced Registration under ROF
The FSA’s proposal to develop a new, digital 
‘enhanced registration’ system for FBOs to make 
it easier for them to register with Local Authorities 
and/or for their information to be included in 
a national database is sensible, supports their 
position as central Competent Authority and 
addresses the current limitations associated with 
businesses merely registering with their local 
authority. Such a system would enable businesses 
consistently to obtain information and guidance 
to help them comply with safety and standards 
regulations before they start trading. Having a 
comprehensive database of FBOs should make 
it easier for public authorities to respond to 
outbreaks of food-borne disease and to improve 
food traceability. It would, however, be a mistake 
if FSA failed to ensure that any new digital 
registration system joins up with the regulatory 
requirements of other government departments. 
It is also important that FSA provides clarification 
on what it intends to do with the data gathered. 
Whilst we accept that there is lots of opportunity 
for FSA to make good use of the data; to date it has 
not communicated and explained these potential 
uses. If there is going to be significant investment 
in a new IT system with which to provide FSA with 
oversight, it is sensible to ask what they will do with 
the information and how they intend to use it to 
influence future policy or regulatory requirements.
Enhanced registration is not without its risks, 
especially if large numbers of FBOs remain 
unregistered and unregulated. The current system, 
with locally based Environmental Health Officers 
‘on the street’, guards against such risks and, at 
the very least, a rigorous enforcement environment 
should be created around those FBOs that do not 
register.
Assurance and Regulated Private 
Assurance (RPA) under ROF
Increased reliance on the role of commercial 
assurance is a central plank of the ROF proposals, 
and the most contentious aspect. The proposals 
strongly reflect the Cabinet Office report on 
regulatory futures,99 and the FSA claims that other 
governments across Europe and around the world 
are placing greater reliance on private-sector 
assurance schemes. The FSA also states that the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, a joint body 
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of the World Health Organisation and Food and 
Agriculture Organisation which, under the rules 
of the World Trade Organisation since 1994, sets 
minimum standards for internationally traded 
foodstuffs, is also exploring the greater use of data 
from private commercial assurance providers.
The FSA is correct when it claims that commercial 
assurance already contributes to other areas of UK 
food regulation, namely to animal feedstuffs and 
primary production, and that many FBOs already 
purchase additional assurance to supplement visits 
from local authority Environmental Health Officers. 
They do that because it may facilitate their entry 
into new markets, and/or because the frequency 
of Local Authority inspections does not guarantee 
the level of brand protection required by retailers 
and/or their insurers. It is also true that private 
assurance service providers hold large amounts 
of data concerning businesses and their levels of 
compliance, and that those data could be made 
available to Local Authorities and inform their 
decisions about the nature, frequency or intensity 
of subsequent official inspections. On the other 
hand, and as the FSA has already acknowledged, 
EU regulations require that its trading partners 
must not use commercial inspections to substitute 
for reduced inspection by public officials.100 . 
It is already clear that FBOs and their consultants 
see little value in assurance being part of ROF 
unless the assurance service providers can set 
a Food Hygiene Rating Scheme (FHRS) score 
for FBOs as part of their assurance contract, but 
that suggestion is opposed by many (though 
not all) Local Authorities. It is also opposed by 
some consultancies and their clients who feel 
that it would adversely impact their commercial 
relationships. It would also be inconsistent with 
current legislative requirements in Northern Ireland 
and Wales. 
The debates surrounding the role of private 
assurance in assigning FHRS scores have led to 
opposition that threatened to destabilize the ROF 
programme. In response, the FSA has developed 
and piloted its proposals with six ‘pathfinder’ local 
authorities and, at the time of writing (July 2018), 
is evaluating a revised Primary Authority / National 
Inspection Strategy approach. The approach is 
based on a draft ‘standard’ set by FSA, that could 
see large, multi-site businesses with an established 
‘Primary Authority’ partnership agreement and a 
good record of compliance having the FHRS scores 
for their outlets set by the Primary Authority on the 
basis of ‘assured data’.  Primary Authority status 
enables businesses to form a legal partnership with 
a single, lead local authority, which then provides 
assured and tailored advice on complying with 
environmental health, trading standards or fire 
safety regulations that other local regulators must 
respect.
That proposal relies on a new Primary Authority 
scheme, being developed by FSA, which is separate 
and different from that operated by the Office for 
Product Safety and Standards (OPSS), which is 
based in the Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy. Primary Authority standards 
for FBOs would be set by the FSA, not the OPSS, 
and it will, in the first place, be open to all multi-
site businesses with a high level of compliance. 
Subsequently, however, the FSA envisages 
that it may be available to single-site FBOs too, 
potentially undermining local food enforcement. 
Under the pilot scheme, Primary Authorities gained 
access to private business data to help determine 
compliance and set Food Hygiene Rating Scheme 
scores. This process was, in effect, a desktop study, 
using available data to simply set the FHRS score 
and decide whether or not local inspections were 
required. The FSA claimed that after some 320 
desktop assessments, the FHRS scores matched 
the local authority’s own assessment in 80% of 
the cases. However, a one-in-five misalignment 
of FHRS scores is too high a failure rate to ensure 
confidence in the scheme, and this needs to be 
urgently addressed. The FSA will need to be able 
to provide evidence that such a desktop exercise 
is capable of providing a suitable replacement for 
interventions carried out by qualified and suitably 
competent environmental health professionals.
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The Standard for Primary 
Authority/National Inspection 
Strategies proposed in ROF
The FSA has now published, within a low-key 
consultation document, the draft criteria that a 
Primary Authority would need to meet before 
implementing a national inspection strategy. It 
intends to turn these criteria into a formal FSA 
‘standard’ that partnerships will need to meet 
before their national inspection strategy can be 
recognised by the FSA.101 
Key components of the draft ‘standard’ include:
• FSA is to be provided with information on the 
number of proactive interventions received 
(including the risk rating categories) as 
well as the number of reactive food-related 
referrals made to the Primary Authority (PA) in 
the previous 12 months;
• Some local authority proactive interaction 
will be required to contribute to verification 
that the national inspection strategy for the 
business is working as intended; 
• The PA should demonstrate its competency 
and capability in relation to the partner 
business (or group of businesses);  
• A business that enters the scheme should 
have food safety ‘prerequisites’ in place and 
that prerequisite information must be made 
available to the PA and to the FSA;
• PAs to have verified the implementation of 
the food safety management system for food 
hygiene, and/or the management controls/
systems in relation to food standards (as 
appropriate); 
• PAs should have a reviewed and verified 
compliance history;
• PAs to have access to and review food safety 
compliance across the business operations 
that are subject to local authority control; 
• Arrangements for the reporting of serious 
incidents that pose an imminent risk of food 
not being safe and/or what it says it is, also 
need to be in place, so that they are promptly 
brought to the PA’s attention;
• The business’s own checks must be carried 
out at a frequency that is no less than they 
would experience from local authority 
interventions;
• PAs will need to provide assurance that the 
business has processes in place to identify 
non-compliances in a timely way and rectify 
them within an appropriate time frame and in 
an appropriate manner to ensure food is safe 
and what it says it is;
• The standard requires evidence of peer 
review, risk-based internal monitoring and/or 
benchmarking.
Whilst, on the face of it, the criteria are sensible, 
each one has potential problems that have yet to 
be fully thought-through.  
Some examples of the potential problems are:
• 12 months’ data are insufficient to 
demonstrate sustained compliance, 
particularly since a significant proportion of 
food businesses are subject to inspections at 
18-month or two yearly intervals! 
• Where local authority proactive inspections 
are to take place to ensure independent 
verification, more information will need to 
be provided to local authorities to enable 
them to plan and resource this work. There is 
also the unresolved issue of how those visits 
will be funded given that businesses with 
national inspection strategies will be removed 
from local authority planned intervention 
programmes.
• In addition to being brought to the attention 
of the PA, serious incidents that pose an 
imminent risk of food not being safe or what it 
says it is, should be brought to the attention 
of the FSA and the relevant local authority, 
but that requirement is not included in 
the draft criteria. Failure to report serious 
incidents to the FSA and local authority could 
have serious impacts on the health of the 
population, consumer confidence in food 
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and the ability of consumers to exercise their 
consumer rights and choices. 
• The frequency of business’s own checks on 
their compliance should be stipulated in 
the criteria and should be no less frequent 
than those required by local authorities. 
Furthermore, there should be a requirement 
for a significant proportion of them to be 
unannounced. 
• There should also be a requirement for 
mandatory, unannounced, third-party audits 
of businesses with a national inspection 
strategy. These should be carried out by 
suitably qualified, competent staff and 
suitably competent and experienced 
Environmental Health Officers, who are 
ideally placed to undertake that role.
• Whilst the requirement for evidence of peer 
review, risk-based internal monitoring and/
or benchmarking of the PA may be sensible, 
the costs of such internal monitoring will be 
passed on to commercial customers and 
therefore to consumers. The system is likely 
to be more, not less, expensive!
Whilst feedback from Primary Authorities that 
participated in the pilot study has been positive, 
the FSA recognises that the scheme cannot 
work currently in Northern Ireland, as there is no 
legislative base there for any Primary Authority 
scheme. Furthermore, the FSA has not yet devised 
an appeal mechanism for FBOs against PAs’ 
proposed FHRS scores. FBOs taking part in the new 
scheme will need a National Inspection Plan (as 
defined under ROF) in place before being allowed 
to participate in the scheme. National Inspection 
Plans will also need to be approved by the FSA, and 
currently there is no indication that FSA has the 
resources to provide such approvals, especially if 
the scheme proves popular.
Although the PA scheme is just one facet of a 
regulated private assurance model, the FSA has 
indicated that it intends to allow data from all 
businesses to inform the nature and frequency of 
official controls and it will set a standard for this. 
FSA is also moving on to determine how it will 
derive value from third-party assurance schemes 
such as BRC Global, and is still exploring the 
future relationship between private assurance and 
official controls. The FSA has acknowledged that 
such a system can only work with ‘mutual trust’ 
and ‘absolute transparency’, but recent evidence 
from within the meat sector, such as 2 Sisters and 
Russell Hume, demonstrate that neither trust nor 
transparency can be guaranteed.
Whilst the FSA has indicated that it will set a 
standard to allow data from businesses to inform 
the nature and frequency of official controls, there 
are significant problems associated with these 
plans. Given that the Government agreed on 6 
July 2018 to remain in full alignment with the EU’s 
requirements after Brexit, the FSA’s proposals risk 
violating some of the EU’s regulations. In a report 
produced by the FSA, in collaboration with the 
British Retail Consortium (BRC) the FSA stated that: 
‘Under current EU law (Regulation (EC) No 
882/2004) on official controls performed to ensure 
the verification of compliance with feed and 
food law, official controls must be carried out by 
competent authorities, i.e. public bodies such as 
local authorities or the FSA. The ability to delegate 
these powers, which includes enforcement actions, 
to other persons such as a certification scheme 
is at present extremely limited and BRC Global 
Standards or similar bodies could not at present 
legitimately perform official controls under EU 
law.’102
The report goes further: 
‘It is considered by the FSA that there is no 
fundamental legal obstacle to the FSA or LAs having 
greater regard for FBOs’ own checks or those 
applied to the FBO as a result of independent third-
party certification, provided that these are used 
to help inform a programme of official controls 
and not treated as a substitute for such controls. 
The degree to which the frequency or intensity 
of official controls might lawfully be reduced in 
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light of regulated private assurance is likely to be 
variable depending upon the circumstances of the 
industry sector in question, and of the complexity, 
sophistication and level of objectivity of any 
applicable private accreditation schemes which 
apply to it’.103 (emphasis added)
But the central plank of ROF is ‘substitution’! The 
more FBOs are covered by reassuring narratives 
from their own ‘assurers’, the fewer inspections 
from the local Competent Authority will be required. 
The minutes of the FSA’s ROF Expert Advisory Group 
meeting on 7 June 2018 said: 
‘Robust forms of industry assurance could be used 
to reduce the burden on regulators and businesses 
that arises from current, and at times duplicated, 
verification of food business controls.’ (Answer A2 
on page 1)
However, in Paragraph 39 Regulation 882/2004 
says:
‘Community controls in third countries are required 
in order to verify compliance or equivalence 
with Community feed and food law as well as 
with the legislation on animal health and, where 
appropriate, welfare. Third countries may also 
be requested to provide information on their 
control systems. This information, which should 
be established on the basis of Community 
guidelines…’.
Those guidelines specify, in Chapter II, Article 4, 
para 2b, that:  ‘The competent authorities shall 
ensure: … (b) that staff carrying out official controls 
are free from any conflict of interest…’ In Article 5: 
on the delegation of specific tasks related to official 
controls, the Regulation says: ‘The competent 
authority may delegate specific tasks related to 
official controls to one or more control bodies in 
accordance with paragraphs 2 to 4’ only if: ‘…there 
is an accurate description of the tasks that the 
control body may carry out and of the conditions 
under which it may carry them out … and, there is 
proof that the control body is impartial and free 
from any conflict of interest as regards the exercise 
of the tasks delegated to it’.   
The FSA has yet to explain how its ROF proposals 
comply with those requirements. 
The importance of the Food 
Hygiene Rating Scheme (FHRS)
It is clear that much depends on the perceived 
value of the FHRS system to both FBOs and 
consumers. The principle of having a FHRS is widely 
supported – it helps consumers to make choices 
about where they eat and buy their food. However, 
there is a growing body of evidence showing 
that some English local authorities do not have 
sufficient capacity to sustain a mandatory food 
hygiene rating scheme. The FSA needs properly 
to explain what a mandatory scheme in England 
might look like and then work with local authorities 
to better understand and quantify any resource 
shortfalls and explore options for addressing them.  
Furthermore, currently FHRS scores are only 
displayed to the public in relation to premises that 
sell foodstuffs directly to the public. On the issue 
of any future right of the public to have access to 
additional information, the ROF 2017 proposals 
were couched in contradictory terms: 
‘There is a balance for us to strike between 
providing consumers with information that gives 
them confidence about the food they are buying, 
and respecting business concerns around sharing 
commercially sensitive data … We believe that 
the interests of the consumer will be better 
served by an effective regulatory regime in 
which food businesses feel confident to share 
data with us in confidence, rather than by the 
routine publication of all and any data we are 
able to access. Under no circumstances will we 
share any data without the express permission 
of its owner, and we will be working closely 
with food businesses, their lawyers and ours to 
establish protocols that are compliant with relevant 
legislation (e.g. on data protection)’104 (Emphases 
added)
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The FSA’s suggestion that the interests of 
consumers are best served by not making 
information available about businesses’ 
compliance with legal requirements in respect 
of hygiene and safety (except via a change in 
the visible green FHRS sticker in the window) is 
unhelpful. Public access to food safety information 
is not just about ‘giving them confidence about 
the food they are buying’, it is about allowing them 
to tell when confidence is, and is not, warranted. 
Allowing FBOs and/or the FSA to keep consumers 
in the dark is antithetical to the interests of 
consumers and the protection of public health.
The challenge of devolution
Devolution of key powers from Westminster to 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland presents 
particular challenges for the FSA’s ROF plans. Food 
safety is a devolved matter, and it follows that 
neither the Westminster Government nor the FSA 
can unilaterally make decisions in respect of food 
safety systems and processes for the devolved 
administrations. It must secure their agreement and 
this will entail additional levels of complexity. The 
FSA should, therefore, fully engage in discussions 
with the devolved administrations to ensure that 
they are clear as to their policies in respect of 
ROF. However, the recent (July 2018) consultation, 
initiated by FSA, on the proposed revisions to the 
Food Law Code of Practice generated by ROF is 
notable in that the consultation has not yet been 
extended to Wales. It is of interest to note that in 
December 2016 the Welsh Government issued a 
position statement on ROF and subsequently, at 
the request of the Minister for Social Services and 
Public Health, set up a working group to provide an 
assurance to Welsh ministers that Wales’s needs 
are taken account of within the ROF programme.105
In respect of the island of Ireland, the Good Friday 
Agreement of April 1998, the foundation of the 
current peace process in Northern Ireland, sets 
out a complex and unique series of provisions and 
establishes a series of co-operative institutions 
relating to a number of areas including:
a. The status and system of government of 
Northern Ireland (NI) within the United 
Kingdom. 
b. The relationship between Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland (ROI).
c. The relationship between the ROI and the 
United Kingdom.
The agreement means, in effect, that ROI has a say 
in matters relating to NI that have an impact in ROI. 
Within the context of Brexit this could arguably 
include any system of food control that is not 
developed within the context of EU membership. 
The FSA should, therefore, have a clear narrative 
around the measures that have been taken to 
comply with the 1998 Agreement.
Implications of ROF in the context 
of Brexit
The FSA’s ROF proposals could potentially weaken 
food standards in the UK at the very time that 
the UK needs to demonstrate to the world that it 
has and maintains rigorous standards. The issues 
experienced in New Zealand, where a very similar 
regulatory model has been introduced, have 
revealed that commercial assurers have a vested 
interest in not revealing to public authorities 
serious shortcomings that they might encounter. 
Furthermore, the FSA’s plans risk undermining the 
ability of UK producers to sell their products to the 
EU after Brexit, as the FSA is still to demonstrate 
how it intends to ensure that its proposals meet 
the regulatory requirements for countries from 
which foodstuffs can be imported into the EU. The 
FSA’s ROF proposals are not currently supported 
by evidence that shows that they are in the 
interests of UK consumers, producers or retailers. 
Such evidence should be provided or, where such 
evidence is not available, the proposals should be 
withdrawn or modified. In any case, these changes 
should be delayed until after the Brexit dust has 
settled. 
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Part 4: Conclusions and 
recommendations: time for 
a Sustainable Food Security 
Policy
With the Chequers Statement and White Paper of 
July 2018, the UK Government has at last begun to 
present a formal negotiating position on Brexit. We 
welcome the belated realisation that food security 
is at stake. We argued in our July 2017 report that 
the time is right to develop a more comprehensive 
and sustainable food system which aims to feed all 
well. We termed this ‘One Nation Food’. 
We recommend that both HM Government and HM 
Opposition clarify their positions on the importance 
of Brexit to UK food security, but also:
We recommend that HM Government:
• Maintains a clear and explicit focus on the 
potential adverse effects of Brexit on food 
security in the UK, while negotiating the UK’s 
future trading relationships with the EU and 
other jurisdictions.
• Publishes proper Brexit impact studies on 
the UK’s agricultural and food system for the 
White Paper and Chequers Statement and 
any subsequent proposals.
• Ensures that high food standards remain at 
the heart of any future trade deals.
• Provides clarity on its proposed migration 
policy, taking account of the contributions 
that non-UK citizens of the EU are making 
to the quantity and quality of the UK’s food 
supply and services.
• Avoids a hard Food Brexit at all costs. The 
UK must not retreat to a WTO-rules-based 
regime. The EU would then categorise the UK 
as a ‘3rd Country’, which could be a recipe for 
chaos. This might benefit some hedge funds 
or traders, but at the cost of undermining the 
quantity and quality of the UK’s food supply.
• Creates a new Sustainable Food Security 
Strategy and ground it in what we are calling 
a ‘One Nation Food Security’ framework. 
Such a framework would engage with the 
complexities of the food system and the 
multiple criteria by which it should be 
evaluated; it should identify clear priorities 
and pathways by which they can and will be 
attained. 
• Recasts the proposed Agriculture Bill as 
a Sustainable Food Bill to provide a new 
legislative framework for a secure and 
sustainable food system integrating public 
health; consumer protection, animal welfare 
and environmental sustainability.
• Provides explicit, public guarantees that 
responsibility for the Food Standards Agency 
will remain with the Department of Health, 
and that it will not be transferred to the 
Department for Environment Food and Rural 
Affairs.
• Identifies opportunities and provides support 
for initiatives to improve the UK’s domestic 
sourcing of food, within the UK’s climatic and 
seasonal constraints. 
• Begins a process of devolved food 
governance for England that works better in 
parallel with those in Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland, and harnesses the energies 
of city mayors and social movements such as 
the Sustainable Food Cities network.
We recommend that the Food Standards 
Agency:
• Addresses the calls for clarification and 
evidence posed in this paper in respect of its 
Regulating Our Future (ROF) programme and, 
where such clarification or evidence is not 
available, then the Agency should modify or 
suspend the introduction of its proposals, at 
least until after Brexit. 
We further recommend that UK citizens, civil 
society organisation and academics make 
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every effort to link the broad sustainability 
challenge into Brexit planning, by:
• Encouraging MPs to ensure there is no 
disruption to EU food supplies at and after 
Brexit.
• Encouraging firms in the agricultural and food 
sector to improve the pay and conditions 
of their employees and to enhance learning 
and skills development and thus improve 
the attractiveness of this work to potential 
recruits. 
• Contributing to regional and local committees 
which champion sustainable food security 
and build representative coalitions for the 
public interest. 
• Researching the conditions under which 
safe and health-enhancing diets would be 
affordable for all groups of consumers.
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Briefing Series
The Food Brexit Briefing series explores the implications of Brexit for the UK food system. It is 
produced by the Food Research Collaboration which brings together academics and civil society 
organisations from across the food system to explore food and the public interest, with a 
particular emphasis on public health, the environment, consumers and social justice. The series 
provides informed reviews of key food issues likely to be – or already – affected by Brexit 
decisions. Recommendations are made for public debate. 
Membership of the Food Research Collaboration is open to academics and NGOs working on food 
matters; futher information:
www.foodresearch.org.uk/become-a-member
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FRC Food Brexit Policy Briefing
Feeding Britain: Food security after Brexit
34
an initiative of the
FOOD RESEARCH
COLLABORATION
for integrated and inclusive food policy
Educating, researching & influencing
Centre for
Food Policy
02070404302
contact@foodresearch.org.uk
www.foodresearch.org.uk
@foodresearchUK
© This working paper is copyright of the authors
ISBN: 978-1-903957-42-4
Lang,T., Millstone, E., Lewis, T., and Marsden, T. Feeding Brit-
ain: food security after Brexit. Food Research Collaboration 
Food Brexit Briefing.
The Food Research Collaboration is an initative of the 
Centre for Food Policy, facilitating the joint working 
between academics and civil society organisations to 
improve the UK food system
